双边密封竞标下的动态P2P网络借贷拍卖机制  

Dynamic auction mechanism of online peer-to-peer lending market considering bilateral sealed bidding

作　　者：周正龙[1] 马本江[1] 胡凤英[1] Zhou Zhenglong;Ma Benjiang;Hu Fengying(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2018年第3期341-354,411,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372061);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(14JJ2017);中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2017zzts043;2017zzts050)

摘　　要：在P2P网络借贷交易的双边市场特征下,提出了双边密封的动态关闭式拍卖机制,并提供了两种不同情形下的模型.这类机制满足激励相容特性,有利于降低羊群效应,并且贷款人和借款人在拍卖中可以根据不同定价采取不同的响应策略.通过数值计算,将该机制分别与拍拍贷平台的撮合机制和Prosper平台的拍卖机制进行了比较.结果表明,该机制的支付成本低于拍拍贷机制和Prosper机制的支付成本,并且借款人可以根据自己对借款需求的紧迫性选择不同的拍卖策略.Considering the bilateral market characteristics of online peer-to-peer（P2 P） lending, this paper proposes a dynamic closed auction mechanism considering bilateral sealed bidding, and provides two different models. The mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility, which is conducive to reduce the herding effect.In this auction, the borrowers and lenders will take different response strategies according to different pricing decisions. A numerical example is given to compare the mechanism with PPDai and Prosper mechanisms respectively. Results show that the payment cost of the mechanism can be lower than that of either PPDai or Prosper mechanisms. According to the urgency of demand, the borrower can choose different strategies freely to obtain the loan.

关 键 词：P2P网络借贷 动态关闭式拍卖 双边密封竞标 拍卖策略 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F724.59