管理层权力与上市公司R&D迎合投资  

Managerial Power and Listed Companies' Catering R&D investment

作　　者：张晓峰[1] 徐寿福[2] 陈晶萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2018年第7期38-47,共10页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"管理层股权激励对资本市场错误定价的影响及其监管研究"(71503162);中国博士后科学基金第57批面上资助项目"股权激励计划对非有效市场中公司投资的影响研究"(2015M570357);第10批特别资助项目"股权激励行权安排对股价崩盘风险的影响及其治理研究"(2017T100288);山东省社会科学基金项目"系统论视野下中国管理的哲学思想基础研究"(17CGLJ24);山东大学青年学术团队项目"创新与企业成长--基于组织情景和传统文化的视角"(IFYT17038);山东大学本科综合改革重点项目"多视角的管理学"(10000075188802)

摘　　要：理性的管理者会通过公司投资迎合资本市场中投资者非理性引起的错误定价,并且这种迎合行为会受到管理层权力大小的影响。本文在检验非有效市场中上市公司R&D迎合投资存在性的基础上,考察了管理层权力对R&D迎合投资的影响,结果发现:在控制了股权融资渠道的影响后,上市公司仍然存在较强的R&D投资-误定价敏感性,表明股票错误定价会通过理性迎合渠道影响公司R&D投资;上市公司R&D迎合投资-误定价敏感性与管理层权力显著正相关,并且在管理层持股堑壕效应较大和当股价被高估时更为显著。本文拓展了关于错误定价影响公司投资过程中代理问题的研究,也为考察管理层权力的影响提供了新的视角。Rational managers can make investments to cater to the mispricing caused by investors＇ irrationality in the market, and such catering behavior will be influenced by managerial power. After exploring the existence of listed companies＇ R＆D catering investment in an inefficient market, this paper investigates the effects of managerial power on the catering R＆D investment. Several findings appear： Chinese listed companies have strong R＆D investment-mispricing sensitivities even after the effects of equity financing channel controlled, which suggests that mispricing affects R＆D investment by rational catering channel. Catering R＆D investment-mispricing sensitivity of listed companies has a positive relationship with managerial power, and this relationship is more significant when managerial entrenchment effect is higher or stock is overpriced rather than underpriced. This study expands the research on agency problem in the context of the effect of mispricing on corporate investment, and also provides a new perspective to investigate managerial power effect.

关 键 词：管理层权力 错误定价 R&D投资 理性迎合 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]