零售商成本信息不对称下三级供应链协调研究  

Research on the Coordination of Three Echelon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Retail's Cost Information

作　　者：陈柳鑫[1] 陈娴 CHEN Liuxin;CHEN Xian(Prof.School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China.)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2018年第3期320-324,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71502049;71501060);中央高校基本科研业务费基金项目(2015B23214)

摘　　要：针对零售商边际成本信息不对称的情形,研究由制造商、分销商及零售商组成的三级供应链收益共享契约协调问题。假设制造商和分销商通过合作博弈的方式共同设计契约模型,以此来最大化供应链总利润。在此基础上,结合数值仿真,将零售商边际成本信息对称和不对称两种情况下的利润模型进行对比分析。结果表明,相对信息对称而言,信息不对称下制造商和分销商的利润减少,而零售商获得了私有信息带来的超额利润,但此种情况会降低整个三级供应链系统的效率。As for retailer having asymmetric information about production marginal cost,how to coordinate the three echelon supply chain under revenue-sharing contract is studied. In order to maximize the total profit of the supply chain,the manufacturer has the right to design the contract model together with the distributor through cooperative game. On this basis,combining with numerical simulation,a comparative analysis about the optimal revenue-sharing strategy under symmetrical information and asymmetrical information are made. The result shows that within the asymmetric information,the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of distributor are all reduced,while the retailer obtains the excess profit from private information. However in this case,the efficiency of the whole three echelon supply chain system is reduced.

关 键 词：三级供应链 边际成本 不对称信息 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]