官员晋升、金融发展与环境污染——来自市长变更的证据  

Official Promotion, Financial Development and Environmental Pollution——Evidence from Mayor Transition

作　　者：谢罗奇[1] 龚玲 赵纯凯 XIE Luo-qi;GONG Ling;ZHAO Chun-kai(School of Business,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105;Institute of Finance and Economics,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105 [2]上海财经大学财经研究所,上海200433

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2018年第8期15-26,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金项目(71703140)

摘　　要：基于我国2005—2013年的地级市面板数据,分析了金融发展背景下官员晋升对环境污染的影响。研究发现,官员晋升会通过金融发展路径加剧环境污染,特别是当官员籍贯与任职地不一致、任期长于平均任期以及官员来自于平调时,官员晋升和金融发展对环境污染的负面影响更为显著。进一步的研究显示：官员晋升中的就业压力会加剧环境污染,而财政压力也会通过金融发展路径加剧环境污染;地方官员不会因环保考核压力而采取＂先污染后治理＂的模式,即使在官员晋升考核机制中纳入环保指标,官员晋升的环境污染效应依然存在,且会通过金融发展路径放大。Based on the panel data of prefecture-level cities in China from 2005 to 2013, this paper studies the influence of official promotion on environmental pollution in the process of financial development. The result shows that official promotion would exacerbate environmental pollution through the path of financial development, especially in areas where officials are not born there or officials＇ term of office is longer than the average term, also officials are transferred from other cities parallelly. Further study finds that,the employment pressure in the process of official promotion will directly cause environmental pollution, while fiscal pressure would indirectly aggravate environmental pollution through the path of financial development. Local officials wouldn＇t be forced to adopt the model of ＂treatment after pollution＂under the pressure of environmental assessment. Therefore, the environmental pollution effects of official promotion still exist and will be amplified through financial factors even if the environmental protection indicators have been written into the system of official assessment.

关 键 词：官员晋升 金融发展 环境污染 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]