市场势力、技术创新与价格歧视  

Market Power,Technological Innovation and Price Discrimination

作　　者：李凯[1] 郭晓玲[1] 冯达 Li Kai;Guo Xiaoling;Feng Da(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China;Bank of China Liaoning Branch,Shenyang 116001,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110169 [2]中国银行辽宁省分行,沈阳116001

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2018年第9期3-10,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然基金资助项目"抗衡势力背景下产业链纵向控制的机理研究"(项目编号:71472032)

摘　　要：本文从反垄断视角出发,将纵向交易互动关系中的价格歧视与市场势力问题纳入到上游制造商工艺创新决策研究框架中,比较分析不同定价模式下买方市场势力对上游创新程度、厂商利润以及消费者剩余的影响情况。研究结果表明:当下游市场中存在买方市场势力时,上游制造商在歧视定价策略下攫取最大利润;统一定价策略下的创新程度最大。对于具有买方市场势力的零售市场而言,三种定价模式下的消费者福利相同,且均高于下游两个市场无买方势力的消费者福利。对于不具有买方势力的零售市场而言,采取统一定价策略能够实现消费者福利最大化。From the perspective of anti-monopoly,we take the price discrimination and market power problem in the context of vertical trading interaction into the upstream manufacturer’ s process innovation decision research framework. We compare the changes of the buyer’ s market power to the degree of innovation of the upstream,the manufacturer’ s profit and the consumers’ surplus under different pricing models. The results show that when the buyer power exists in the downstream market,the upstream manufacturer takes the maximum profit under the discriminatory pricing strategy,and the innovation degree is the largest under the uniform pricing strategy. For the retail market with buyer’ s market power,the consumer benefits of the three pricing modes are the same,and they are all higher than the welfare of the two markets without buyer’ s market power. For the retail market that does not have the buyer power,the adoption of a unified pricing strategy can maximize the welfare of the consumer.

关 键 词：纵向关系 市场势力 技术创新 价格歧视 统一定价 市场圈定 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学] F224.32