机构地区:[1]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095
出 处:《中国人口·资源与环境》2018年第9期133-141,共9页China Population,Resources and Environment
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大项目"农民获得更多土地财产权益的体制机制创新研究"(批准号:17ZDA076);淮安市委托项目"培育新型农业经营主体促进农民增收"(批准号:2017001);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学项目"村委会参与农地规模流转的行为选择研究"(批准号:2016SJD630003);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目"农户生计资本异质性;农地流转及其绩效研究"(批准号:KYCX18_0729)
摘 要:农业生产效率变化是地方政府干预流转政策效果的重要表现。本文依据江苏省六个市的调研数据,在运用数据包络分析法(DEA)分析农户生产效率的基础上,进一步采用Tobit回归模型对比地方政府是否干预以及不同干预角色对农户生产效率的影响差异,为完善地方政府农地流转服务决策提供参考。研究发现:(1)样本农户的综合效率在0.406和1之间,平均综合效率为0.737,具有较大的提升空间。(2)地方政府干预农地流转对农户生产效率有显著的负向作用,可能由于地方政府流转补贴以及大规模流转偏好,导致政府干预下农户经营规模过大,经营能力与规模不匹配导致了效率损失。(3)地方政府不同干预角色对农户生产效率均有显著的负效应,表明地方政府干预行为出现"政府失灵",同时,地方政府主导型对生产效率的负向影响小于中介型,说明政府主导型一定程度上纠正了中介型干预的"政策失灵",主要原因是地方政府较好地减少了农地流转违约风险,约束了经营主体生产行为。(4)其他变量中,土地投入、地块数量、技术指导对农业生产效率具有显著正向影响,增加劳动与资本投入、以及自然灾害会导致农业生产效率下降。基于以上分析,建议对政府的农地流转角色和行为进行限定,将政府权力限定在健全农地流转市场,强化监管服务功能,培育新型经营主体,防范风险等方面,逐渐退出"双重"角色,依靠市场主体发挥作用;同时,地方政府切忌盲目推动农地流转,应根据地区经济发展水平,以适度规模为前提,确立效率优先和家庭经营模式为基础的农地流转政策。The change of agricultural production efficiency is an important manifestation of the effect of local government' s participation in the policy of circulation. Based on the survey data of six cities in Jiangsu Province, this paper used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to study the production efficiency of farmers, and further used Tobit regression model to compare and analyze the intervention of local governments and the differences impact of local governments' different intervention roles on the farmers' production efficiency, and provide references for improving farmland circulation service decision-making of local governments. The study found that : ①The sample in the survey area was between 0. 406 and 1, and the average comprehensive efficiency was 0. 737, which had great room for improvement. ②Local government intervention in farmland transfer had a significantly negative effect on farmers' production efficiency. It may be because the circulation subsidy and the large circulation preference of local government, which lead to the too large scale of farmers' management under the intervention of the government, and the mismatch between the manage capacity and the scale, resulting in the loss of efficiency. ③The different intervention roles of local government all had a significantly negative effect on the production efficiency of farmers, indicating that local government behavior has ‘ policy failure '. Meanwhile, the negative impact of local government-led production on production efficiency was less than that of intermediaries. This showed that the government directly involved in the circulation of agricultural land reduced the risk of default, restricted the production behavior of the main business entities, and to some extent, rectified the ‘ policy failure' of intermediary participation. ④ Among other variables, the input of land, the number of plots and technical guidance had a significantly positive impact on the agricultural production efficiency. Increasing labor and capi
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