控制权变更视角下国企混改对投资效率的影响  

Influences of Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises on Investment Efficiency from Perspective of Change of Control

作　　者：刘翰林[1] 赵宇朦 LIU Han-lin;ZHAO Yu-meng(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第4期20-26,共7页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：以2010-2016年上市A股进行混合所有制改革的国有企业为研究样本,从控制权变更视角探究国企混改对投资效率的影响。研究发现:在国企混改过程中,当混合深入度较低时,非国有股份的加入会引发国有控制人的机会主义行为,降低企业投资效率;随着混合深入度的提高,持股比例较高的非国有股东的监督制衡作用缓解了其与国有控股股东之间的代理冲突,提高投资效率;随着混合深入度的进一步提高,企业的实际控制人变更为非国有股东,引发非国有控股股东的机会主义行为,投资效率降低。基于以上研究结论,建议国企混改过程中,要合理配置非国有持股比例,以充分发挥非国有资本的监督制衡作用,同时也要防止控制权变更引发的实际控制人的机会主义行为。The state-owned enterprises with mixed ownership reforms listed on the A-share market from 2010to 2016 are taken as a sample of the study. From the perspective of the change of control, the impact of themixed ownership reform on the investment efficiency of the state-owned enterprises is explored. It finds that inthe process of the mixed ownership reform of the state-owned enterprises, when the degree of blending is low,the non-state-owned shares will trigger the opportunist behavior of the state-owned controllers and reduce theinvestment efficiency of enterprises, as the depth of the blending degree increases, the proportion of sharesheld is higher. High non-state-owned shareholders’ checks and balances have eased the agency conflicts withthe state-controlled shareholders and improved the investment efficiency. With further increase in the degree ofintegration, the actual controllers of enterprises have been changed to non-state-owned enterprises, triggeringnon-state-owned controlling shareholders. The opportunistic behavior reduces the investment efficiency. Basedon the above research conclusions, it advices that during the process of the mixed ownership reform of thestate-owned enterprises, the proportion of non-state-owned holdings in order to give full play to the role of non-state- owned capital in supervision and balance must be rationally allocated. At the same time, the opportunis-tic behavior of the actual controllers caused by changes in control must also be prevented.

关 键 词：控制权变更 国有企业 混合所有制改革 投资效率 混合深入度 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]