基于信用激励机制的移动网络路由优化研究  

Research on Routing Optimization of Mobile Network Based on Credit Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：葛伟伦[1] GE Wei-lun(Yungui College of Information,Anhui Finance ＆ Trade Vocational College,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财贸职业学院云桂信息学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《信阳农林学院学报》2018年第3期116-119,共4页Journal of Xinyang Agriculture and Forestry University

基　　金：2018年安徽高校省级重点自然科学研究项目(KJ2018A0910)

摘　　要：路由在移动网络中扮演着重要的角色,大多数移动网络路由策略假定了网络节点无私地在数据传输中转发消息。然而,实际上由于存在节点资源有限等原因,网络中的节点可能是自私的。对此,本文提出一种基于博弈论的激励感知路由策略应用于自私移动网络。该策略利用Rubinstein-Stahl讨价还价模型对数据转发过程进行建模,考虑节点资源和节点之间的信任度来设计合适的价格函数。仿真实验的结果表明,该策略能够在具有自私节点的移动网络中拥有较好的性能。Routing plays an important role in mobile networks. Most mobile network routing strategies assume that network nodes selflessly froward messages during data transmission. However, due to the fact that there are limited node resources, the nodes in the network may be selfish. In this regard, this paper proposes a motivation - aware routing strategy based on game theory applied to selfish mobile networks. This strategy uses the Rubinstein- Stahl bargaining model to model the information transfer process between nodes, and considers the credit between nodes and resource of nodes to design an appropriate price function. The simulation results show that the strategy can have better performance in mobile networks with selfish nodes.

关 键 词：移动网络 路由优化 博弈论 信用激励感知 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]