论中央银行监管职能的分离与回归——以英国中央银行法制变迁为进路  

On Separation and Return of the Central Bank's Function of Supervision——Focusing on the Legislation of Central Bank in the UK

作　　者：夏梓耀[1] Xia Ziyao(Operations Office,The People9 s Bank of China,Beijing 100045)

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行营业管理部,北京100045

出　　处：《河南财经政法大学学报》2018年第5期147-155,共9页Journal of Henan University of Economics and Law

摘　　要：二十世纪八九十年代以英格兰银行为代表开启的中央银行去监管化法制改革,其主要理由在于货币政策与金融监管之间存在冲突,以及由中央银行实施金融监管可能造成道德风险。改革后英格兰银行的实践表明,中央银行去监管化并未解决货币政策与金融监管之间的冲突问题,而道德风险问题又无须通过中央银行去监管化解决,改革预期目的未能实现。此外,中央银行去监管化造成中央银行与金融监管机构在协调上的严重问题,以致对2007年肇始的金融危机处置失措,中央银行与金融监管机构履职均陷入困境。危机后,英国调整中央银行立法重新赋予英格兰银行金融监管职能,成效显著。英国中央银行监管职能分离又回归的教训与经验,为中国当下的金融监管体制改革提供了有益镜鉴以及富有启发意义的解释视角。The reasons of the legal reform of deregulation of the central bank represented by the Bank of England in the 1980s and 1990s include that there are conflicts between the monetary policy and financial supervision, and that the financial supervision implemented by the central bank generally result in moralhazards. The practice indicates that the deregulation of the central bank does not solve ththe monetary policy and financial supervision. On the contrary, the deregulation results in conficts bcentral bank and the supervisory^ agency so that tliey cannot take effective actions to combat tlie financial crisisin 2007. In addition, the moral hazards can be solved by otlier measures except deregulation. After tlie crisis in2007, the UK passes laws to make the Bank of England undertake the function of financial supervision again and these laws achieve notable results. The experiences and lessons learned from the reform of central bank regimes in the UK will be beneficial for China.

关 键 词：中央银行 英格兰银行 金融监管 中国人民银行法 

分 类 号：D912.281[政治法律—民商法学]