从江西赛维破产案谈重整计划的强制批准制度  

Study on Cram-down in Reorganization Procedure——Based on the Case of LDK Solar Co.,Ltd.

作　　者：王文敏 WANG Wenmin(School of Economic Law,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法学院,中国上海201620

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2018年第3期69-77,共9页Business Economic Review

基　　金：2014年国家社科基金项目<国家治理体系中司法裁判与公共政策互动关系研究>(项目编号A111100314)

摘　　要：重整计划的强制批准制度在2006年颁布的新《企业破产法》中被首次引入,该制度赋予法院在重整计划未获得债权人会议所有表决组通过,但满足一定法定条件时强制批准该计划的权力。强制批准制度无疑对推动重整程序的进行、恢复企业活力具有重大意义。本文以江西赛维破产重整案为切入点,分析强制批准制度所面临的价值冲突,介绍目前我国强制批准制度存在的问题和美国破产法的相关规定,并提出完善我国强制批准制度的建议。Cram-down in reorganization procedure was first introduced in2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.It allows the court compulsively put a reorganization plan in effect if it is in line with the statutory standards,when some classes do not accept it.Cram-down is definitely good for the whole reorganization procedure and for helping debtors.This article includes an example of cram-down and the regulation of American bankruptcy law.In addition,drawbacks of the existing regulation and some suggestions will be introduced.

关 键 词：重整 重整计划 强制批准 价值冲突 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]