制造业企业内部创新行为的演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Research on Manufacturing Enterprise Internal Innovation Behaviors

作　　者：李君昌 樊重俊[1] 杨云鹏[1] 袁光辉 王来 LI Jun-chang;FAN Chong-jun;YANG Yun-peng;YUAN Guang-hui;WANG lai(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science ＆ Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;School of Information Management ~ Engineering,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Experimental Center,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院,上海200433 [3]上海财经大学实验中心,上海200433

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2018年第4期163-171,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71303157);上海市教育委员会科研创新重点基金资助项目(14ZZ131);上海市一流学科资助基金资助项目(S1205YLXK);上海市社科规划青年课题基金资助项目(2014EGL007);沪江基金资助项目(D14008)

摘　　要：在新兴技术、新营销模式下研发与销售环节是制造业企业价值链中的战略环节。以宝钢集团为例，引入投入成本控制的补贴制度和企业内部整体创新水平概念，构建了补贴制度下制造业企业两部门的演化博弈系统。通过分析该系统平衡点的稳定条件，给出了系统演化相位图和企业理想创新状态的参数范围。针对系统不同的初始状态，通过MATLAB仿真不同补贴系数下两部门创新投入行为演化的趋势，研究发现：各部门的协同创新收益、“搭便车”收益、创新投入成本，以及企业的补贴力度都会影响企业内部的整体稳定创新水平。当补贴系数超过，临界值时，随着补贴力度的加大，企业内部的整体创新水平不断提高，并最终达到理想状态。结合研究结论和宝钢集团发展瓶颈，提出在技术变革下制造业企业提升内部创新水平的建议。The R＆D and the sales are manufacturing enterprise＇ strategic links in emerging technology and new marketing mode. Taking Baosteel Group as an example, subsidy system controlled by input cost and overall innovation level in manufacturing enterprise were introduced for constructing the evolutionary game system of manufacturing enterprise＇s two sectors innovation. Then, the phase diagram of evolutionary game system was drawn, and the range of parameters in regard to the ideal state of manufacturing enterprise was calculated with analyzing stability condition of system＇s equilibrium points. As to different initial states of the system, the innovation investment behaviors of two departments were simulated by MATLAB under different subsidy coefficients. It is concluded that all departments- collaborative innovation revenue, ＇free riding- revenue, innovation input cost, as well as enterprise subsidy strength can affect the overall stability of manufacturing enterprise＇s internal innovation level. The overall innovation level of manufacturing enterprise is continuously improved and eventually reaches at ideal state with subsidy strength increased, when subsidy coefficient exceeds threshold. Finally, suggestions on manufacturing enterprise internal innovation under technological evolution were put forward combining key issues of Baosteel Group＇s development and this research.

关 键 词：制造业 价值链 内部创新 演化博弈 政策仿真 

分 类 号：F406.2[经济管理—产业经济]