半强制分红政策与再融资企业的盈余管理——来自PSM的证据  

Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy and the Earnings Management of Refinancing Companies:Evidence from PSM

作　　者：余国杰[1] 赵钰 YU Guojie;ZHAO Yu(Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2018年第5期75-85,93,共12页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672131)

摘　　要：证监会2006年颁布实施了半强制分红政策,对有再融资需求的上市公司的分红比例做了硬性规定。通过PSM(倾向得分匹配)方法研究半强制分红政策的实施对上市公司盈余管理的影响,结果表明半强制分红政策的实施导致了再融资上市公司为了达到相应分红比例的监管门槛而进行更多的盈余管理。进一步研究还发现:在再融资上市公司中,国有企业的盈余管理程度高于非国有企业,其应计盈余管理程度和真实盈余管理程度都较高;而非国有企业盈余管理的程度显著低于国有企业,并且其盈余管理主要是依靠较为隐蔽的真实盈余管理,尤其是依靠真实盈余管理方式中的产品成本来进行操纵。The China Securities Regulatory Commission（ CSRC） issued a dividend policy in 2006 which set minimum payout levels for firms wishing to issue seasoned equity offerings. This paper studies the influence of semi-mandatory dividend policy on earnings management of listed companies by means of PSM（ propensity score matching） method. The results indicate that the implementation of the semi-mandatory dividend policy leads to more earnings management of the refinancing listed companies in order to meet the regulatory threshold of the corresponding dividend ratio. The further research shows that in refinancing listed companies,state-owned companies tend to carry out more earnings management than non-state-owned companies in both accrued earnings management and real earnings management. However,non-state-owned companies tend to carry out a lower level of earnings management and are more inclined to choose real earnings management especially by abnormal product costs to manipulate earnings.

关 键 词：半强制分红政策 盈余管理 再融资 国有控股 股权融资 投资者利益 现金股利 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学] F275