基于演化博弈理论的WEEE方面政府环境规制策略研究  

Research on the Government Regulation of WEEE Environment Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：原逸超 石岿然[2] YUAN Yi-chao;SHI Kui-ran(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Tech University,Nanjing 211800,China;School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211800 [2]南京审计大学金融学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第16期55-63,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(18AGL001);江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(苏政办发(2014)37号);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(SJCX17_0302)

摘　　要：随着科技的进步,大量废弃的电子产品（WEEE）不仅对环境构成威胁,也造成了严重的资源浪费.电子企业构建逆向物流,对于政府环境监管具有必要性和现实意义.应用演化博弈理论研究政府与企业的互动,考察企业利用回收物生产新产品时的演化稳定策略,并借助Matlab进行了仿真分析.结果表明：政府监管奖励、监管成本、企业利用回收WEEE生产新产品的额外收益、政府给予积极构建逆向物流企业的补贴是影响演化稳定性的关键因素,通过调节这些参数,有助于使系统快速有效地向企业自觉构建逆向物流、政府缩小监管比例的方向演化.With the progress of science and technology, a large number of waste electrical and electronic equipment （WEEE） not only poses a threat to the environment, but also causes serious waste of resources. It＇s necessary and practically significant for the government envi- ronmental regulation to implement reverse logistics. This paper employs evolutionary game theory to study interaction of governments and firms and investigates the evolutionary stable strategies of firms using recycled wastes to produce new products. Also, numerical examples carried out by Matlab are presented. The results show that rewards of government regulation, supervision costs, additional benefits of firms using recycled WEEE to make new products, and subsidies from the government to actively implement reverse logistics for firms are key factors affecting evolutionary stable strategies. By controlling these factors, it is helpful for dynamic systems evolve quickly and effectively towards the direction where firms would consciously implement reverse logistics and the governments would reduce the proportion of supervision.

关 键 词：电子废弃物 逆向物流 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F416.6[经济管理—产业经济] F252[环境科学与工程—环境工程] X32