基于博弈论的服务外包双方决策模型分析  

Decision Study on the assignment of Service Outsourcing in Production Service Enterprise and Manufacturing Industry with Game Theory

作　　者：肖吉军[1] 师亚玲 郭曼华 XIAO Ji-jun;SHI Ya-ling;GUO Man-hua(Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Business School,Guilin 541004,China)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2018年第3期71-75,共5页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：广西教育厅人文社科重点项目(ZD2014055);国家自然科学基金项目(71162017)

摘　　要：在讨论服务型制造的起源和发展基础上,运用博弈论模型,对当前国际国内企业界和管理理论界关心和研究的制造业企业服务外包问题进行了数理研究,探讨制造业企业服务外包的成本因素,并分析在服务外包情形下生产性服务企业的产品价格及服务外包双方的获利情况。最终得到了如下主要结论：随着生产性服务企业数的增加,制造业企业的利润额逐渐上升,同时生产性服务企业的产品价格持续下降;当生产性服务企业数等于1,即处于垄断地位时,其获得的利润额最大,否则,当企业数大于2时,所有生产性服务企业的利润总和还不如制造业企业。研究结果为服务外包条件下制造业企业和生产性服务企业合理安排生产和定价提供了有益的管理启示。Based on the discussion of the origin and development of service-oriented manufacturing,this paper makes a mathematical research on the service outsourcing of manufacturing enterprises which are concerned and studied by the international and domestic business circles and economic theorists with the models of the game theory. The paper discusses the cost factors of manufacturing outsourcing,and analyzes the product price of productive service enterprises in the circumstance of outsourcing and profitability of the service outsourcing enterprises. And the following main conclusions are proved： with the increase in the number of enterprises n,the greater the profits of manufacturing enterprises is. In contrast,productive service enterprises pricesp1 continues to decline. When in a monopoly position,its profit is the largest; otherwise,n 2,the total profit of all productive service enterprises is less than that of the manufacturing enterprises. Our research results provide some interesting managerial in sights for the scheduling of manufacturing enterprises and productive service enterprises in the case of manufacturing outsourcing.

关 键 词：服务型制造 服务外包 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274