政府和施工企业在建筑废弃物资源化管理中的演化博弈研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Government and Construction Enterprises in the Resource Management of Construction Waste

作　　者：胡娅莎 马慧民[2] HU Ya-sha;MA Hui-min(School,University of Shanghai For Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;Busbwss School,Shanghai Dianji University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海电机学院商学院,上海201306

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2018年第5期575-583,595,共10页Technology and Innovation Management

摘　　要：通过建立建筑废弃物资源化利用过程中政府与施工企业的演化博弈模型,并对复制动态方程和演化稳定性的推导分析得到9种不同情况下的政府与施工企业资源化利用行为的策略选择。运用数值仿真演示不同参数变化时对演化结果和演化路径的影响,分析9种因素对策略选择的影响,结果表明增大施工企业资源化利用收益,降低花费成本,增大名誉损失有利于施工企业资源化利用建筑废弃物,增大政府积极监管获得的正向激励,增大政府不作为声誉损失,降低政府监管成本,将会促进政府部门选择积极监督。因此,必须同时针对政府和企业设计合理的激励和约束机制,引导两者向合理的目标迈进。Through the establishment of evolutionary- game model of government and construction enterprises in the process of resource utilization of construction waste, and through the deduction and analysis of replication dynamic equation and evo- lutionary stability, this paper obtained the strategy- selection of government and construction enterprise resource utilization in nine different situations. The influence of nine factors on strategy selection was analyzed by numerical simulation. The results show that increasing the benefit of construction enterprises in resource utilization and reducing the cost and increasing the loss of reputation are beneficial to the construction Utilization of construction waste by enterprises. Increasing the positive in- centives the government actively regulates, increasing loss of government reputation and reducing government supervision costs will encourage government deparlments to choose to actively monitor. Therefore, a reasonable incentive and restraint mechanisnl for the government and enterprises must be designed to guide the two to a reasonable goal.

关 键 词：演化博弈 建筑废弃物 资源化利用 政府监督 演化路径 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]