公司治理与金融监管互动中的银行股东道德风险规制  

On the Regulation against Moral Hazards of Bank Shareholders in the Perspective of the Interaction between Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

作　　者：阳建勋[1] YANG Jian-xun(Law School,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《现代法学》2018年第4期122-135,共14页Modern Law Science

基　　金：2017年国家社科基金一般项目"P2P网贷信息披露的公私法合作机制研究"(17BFX094)

摘　　要：银行股东道德风险是银行公司治理与金融监管对其产生的负面激励,股东有限责任、存款保险、对问题银行的救助以及规避金融监管的金融创新是其产生的重要诱因。矫正银行股东道德风险的制度演变,呈现出公司治理与金融监管互动融合的趋势。该趋势是公私法合作规制理念的体现,旨在实现金融效率与金融安全之平衡。导致银行股东道德风险的上述因素在我国不同程度存在,我国金融市场约束机制不够完善,银行公司治理缺乏有效的私法制度支持,缺乏体现银行公司治理特殊性要求的制度安排;银行资本监管制度与限制银行股东权的规定均有待完善。为防范化解金融风险,我国应当以公司治理与金融监管互动为中心,完善对银行股东道德风险的法律规制。Moral risks of bank shareholders are negative incentives resulted from bank＇s corporate governance and regulation system,important causes of which are limited responsibility for shareholders,deposit insurance,aid for problematic bank and financial innovation aimed to avoid financial regulation. How to regulate against them？ There has been a trend of interaction between corporate governance and financial regulation,which is the embodiment of the idea of regulation cooperation through public and private law,aiming to achieve the balance between financial efficiency and financial security. In our country the above factors leading to bank shareholder＇s moral risks exist in different degrees. On the one hand,China＇s financial market restraint mechanism is not perfect. For example there is lack of effective private law for bank corporate governance which doesn＇t reflect bank corporate governance particularity. On the other hand,bank capital regulation system and rules restricting bank shareholder＇s right are yet to be perfect. In order to prevent and defuse financial risks our country should improve legal regulation against bank shareholder＇s moral risks upon the basis of the interaction between corporate governance and financial regulation.

关 键 词：银行股东 有限责任 大而不倒 金融创新 道德风险 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]