人工智能法律主体地位的法哲学思考  

A Philosophical Thought on the Legal Subjectivity of AI

作　　者：龙文懋[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学知识产权学院,上海201620

出　　处：《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》2018年第5期24-31,共8页Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(16ZDA076)"驱动知识产权强国战略的职务发明制度研究"

摘　　要：现代法律制度预设的主体是理性主体。后现代哲学家宣称"主体死了",这并不意味着法律主体的消亡,而应理解为理性主体哲学观念的破碎以及理性法律主体预设的修正。与理性主体预设相对,法律上还有一个欲望主体的预设,该预设的当代价值在于,它为我们思考法律主体的本质提供了新的维度,从而为法学上关于法律主体的规划提供了新的依据。该文以拉康的欲望主体理论为视角,对人工智能是否应当获得法律主体地位的问题加以审视,提出人工智能是人类技术理性的延伸,似乎与理性法律主体的预设相契合,但是这并不意味着人工智能可以成为适格的法律主体,由于人工智能不具备欲望的机制,它不具备主体性;而将人工智能拟制为法律主体,当前并无迫切的现实需要,也缺乏可行性,并且有导致人的价值贬抑和物化、异化的危险。The legal subject of modem law is a reasonable subject. It is claimed by post - modem philosopher that subject is dead. This doesnt mean the death of the legal subject, it means the crash of reasonable subject and the amend- ment to the presupposition of reasonable legal subject. Besides the presupposition of reasonable subject, there is another presupposition - the presupposition of desire subject. The value of it is, it delivers us new aspects to think of the nature of legal subject, thus gives us new basis to the planning of legal subject. This dissertation discusses on whether AI should be awarded the qualification of legal subject on the basis of Lacanian theory of desire subject. It declares that AI is the exten- sion of the technological reason of mankind, thus it seems it is equal to reasonable subject. But on the contrary, it is not suitable to treat AI as legal subject, for it canl desire. Neither should AI become a legal fiction of subject, because we neednt do that now, and we will devalue mankind if we do that, and the idea is not practical.

关 键 词：人工智能 法律主体 理性主体 欲望主体 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]