胡塞尔与塞尔的意向性与意识观点之比较  

Comparison between Husserl's and Searle's Intentionality and Consciousness Concepts

作　　者：尹维坤[1] YIN Wei-kun(School of Public Administration,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,Cruangdong,China)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学公共管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第3期117-122,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学规划一般项目"基于先验论证的语境主义知识论研究"(GD17CZX01);国家社科基金一般项目(18BZX040)

摘　　要：意向性被一般地被看成是意识的一种特征,但是这种概括太简单而不全面。其实,在意向性和意识研究的文献中,对意识和意向性的关系有不同说法。这些不同说法中尤以胡塞尔和塞尔为典型代表。胡塞尔将意向性看作严格意义上说明意识特性的东西,意识就是意向体验;而塞尔则将意向性仅看作意识的特征之一。他们在意识统一问题上的立场有相似之处,即都主张意识是统一的,但在统一的形式上有重大区别。他们之间的区别就在意识统一的方向不同:胡塞尔用意向性统一意识,塞尔用意识统一意向性。Intentionality is generally seen as a feature of consciousness.But this summary is too simple and incomplete.In fact,there are various versions on the relationship between intentionality and consciousness in the literature.Particularly,Husserl＇s and Searle＇s version are representative.Husserl saw intentionality as the thing that would explain the characteristic of consciousness in strict sense,consciousness is the intentional experience;Searle only saw intentionality as one of the characteristics of consciousness.Husserl＇s and Searle＇s positions in the consciousness of unity problems have similarities,namely their advocating awareness is unified,but has significant difference in a unified form.The difference between them on the unity consciousness are in different directions：Husserl unifies consciousness with intentionality,Searle unifies consciousness with unity.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 塞尔 意识 意向性 

分 类 号：B151[哲学宗教—世界哲学]