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作 者:葛文慧 于涛[1] 葛文慧于涛 GE Wenhui;YU Tao
机构地区:[1]南京大学建筑与城市规划学院
出 处:《现代城市研究》2018年第9期41-46,共6页Modern Urban Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目“制度变迁视角下的扩权强镇及其地域空间效应研究--以长三角地区为例”(41101142);国家社会科学基金项目.中国城市增长模式转型研究”(09CJL046);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(1118090207)资助;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(NO.090214380024).
摘 要:简政放权的背景下,市县行政管理架构日趋扁平化,在激发地方发展活力的同时也使得地方竞争日趋激烈。规划权是直接影响城市空间发展的重要权力要素,并且贯穿市县政府利益博弈的始终。从规划权角度切入,认为在现行制度框架下,市县之间难以形成平等互信的沟通与合作模式,往往容易陷入囚徒困境的博弈悖论。应通过构建市县之间双向沟通平台,并通过上级政府的监督机制增加非合作博弈成本,促进市县之间形成新的博弈均衡。With the simplification of power and decentralization, the administrative structure of cities and counties has become more and more flattened. While stimulating the development of local vitality, local competition has also become increasingly fierce. Planning right is an important right element which directly affects the development of urban space, and runs through the game of interests of city and county governments. From the perspective of planning right, it is considered that under the current institutional framework, it is difficult for cities and counties to form a pattern of communication and cooperation based on equality and mutual trust, which tends to fall into the game paradox of prisoners' predicament. The two- way communication platform between cities and counties should be established and the non-cooperative game costs should be increased through the supervision mechanism of the higher-level government to promote the formation of a new game equilibrium between cities and counties.
分 类 号:TU982.21[建筑科学—城市规划与设计] TU982.27
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