政府补贴模式与产学联盟内部企业研发响应策略——基于演化博弈模型的仿真分析  

Governmental Subsidy Model and R&D Strategy of Enterprises in Industry and Education Alliance:A Simulation Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：王昳玢 潘祺志[1] WANG Yi-bin;PAN Qi-zhi(College of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Collegel of Economics and Management,Baotou Teachers s College,Baotou 014030,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]包头师范学院经济管理学院,内蒙古包头014030

出　　处：《东北财经大学学报》2018年第5期49-57,共9页Journal of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"十二五时期可持续节能路径分析"(11CJY008)

摘　　要：本文在"承诺维系下的合作"与"背叛发生时的竞争"两种情景下,考察了企业参与产学联盟协同研发的策略演化过程,并比较了政府补贴模式的差异性激励效应。结论表明,在"承诺维系下的合作"情景下,事前补贴与事后补贴的政府激励模式不存在激励效应差异,此时补贴强度若达到企业策略转换触发阈值,将有效增强产学联盟协同研发的政策激励效应。但在"背叛发生时的竞争"情景下,奖励性的事后补贴模式存在扭曲激励效应,此时事前补贴才是更优的政府激励策略。This paper investigates the evolutionary process of enterprises R＆D participating in industry-academy alliance under the situation of“cooperation under commitment maintained”and“competition when betrayal occurs”,and compares the differential incentive effects of the government subsidy model. The results show that： under the situation of“cooperation under commitment maintained”, there is no incentive effect difference between the government incentive model of Beforehand-subsidy and Afterwards-subsidy. In this case, if the subsidy strength reaches the trigger threshold of corporate policy conversion, it will effectively enhance the policy incentive effect. But in the situation of“competition when Betrayal occurs”, the Afterwards-subsidy model has a distorting incentive effect, the Beforehand-subsidy model is a better government incentive strategy.

关 键 词：政府补贴模式 产学联盟 企业研发 承诺与背叛 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F273.1