电信运营商与分销商渠道冲突分析  

Analysis of Channel Conflict between Telecom Operators and Distributors

作　　者：程艳[1,2] 冯慧 CHENG Yan;FENG Hui(Institute of Economic;Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Key Research Base Zhejiang Gongshang University Modern Business Center,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学经济学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江工商大学教育部人文社科重点研究基地浙江工商大学现代商贸中心,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《齐齐哈尔大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第9期85-89,共5页Journal of Qiqihar University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)

基　　金：浙江省高校人文社科重点研究基地(浙江工商大学应用经济学)项目(JYTYYJJ20140202);教育部人文社科重点研究基地浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心;浙江省2011协同创新中心--现代商贸流通体系建设协同创新中心项目(2016ZSDSM102)

摘　　要：电信运营商分销渠道冲突的现实背景是基于运营商和分销商之间的耦合共轭关系。本文运用博弈论分析方法,通过囚徒困境模型、"智猪博弈"和委托代理模型,描述运营商与分销商之间的渠道冲突机制。研究发现:实力相当的渠道商之间的冲突来源于个体理性与集体理性的冲突;实力较弱的分销商的"搭便车"行为,导致了社会渠道中的分销商与自有渠道中的渠道商之间的冲突,即水平渠道冲突。运营商与分销商之间的垂直渠道冲突,来源于运营商在耦合共轭关系中,较难满足委托代理中的激励相容约束条件,作为代理方的分销商往往达不到运营商所期望的努力程度,从而导致运营商收益受损。最后,本文基于电信运营商与分销商冲突的主要原因的分析,提出渠道优化建议。The realistic background of the distribution channel conflict of telecommunications operators is based on the coupling conjugation relationship between the operators and the distributors. In this paper, we use game analysis method to describe the channel conflict mechanism between operators and distributors through prisoner＇s dilemma model, ＂ boxed pigs＂ game and principal-agent model. The study founds： When the distributors both have considerable strength, channel conflict comes from the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality; weaker distributors of the ＂ free rider＂ behavior leads to conflict between social channel distributors and that in operators＇ channel. The reason of the vertical channel conflict between operators and distributors in the conjugate relationship is that operators are difficult to meet the principal-agent incentive compatibility constraints, and the agent distributors seldom reach operators expect that leads operators＇ benefits damage. Finally, based on the analysis of the main causes of the conflict between the telecommunications operators and the distributors, this paper puts forward the suggestions for the optimization of the channels.

关 键 词：渠道冲突 博弈论 耦合共轭 社会渠道 自有渠道 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F626