腐败治理动了政治关联企业的“奶酪”吗?——基于避税的视角  

Does Anti-Corruption Move the Cheese of Politically Connected Firms? From a Perspective of Tax Avoidance

作　　者：付朝干 李增福[1] Fu Chaogan;Li Zengfu(School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou;Guangxi Cadres University of Economics and Management,Nanning)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院 [2]广西经济管理干部学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2018年第5期127-134,共8页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目“中国上市公司真实活动盈余管理行为研究”(项目编号:71172198);华南师范大学2016年研究生创新计划“腐败治理对企业绩效的影响研究”(项目编号:2016WKXM04)

摘　　要：文章分析认为政治关联企业会通过“好孩子”幸运机制进行合法避税，非政治关联企业会通过“非法寻租”实现避税。腐败治理将更多影响到非政治关联企业的行为，而不是政治关联企业。文章基于十八大以来的腐败治理对A股民营上市公司避税行为的冲击证实了这一假说，且腐败治理对市场化程度低地区的非政治关联企业影响更为显著。研究结果表明，腐败治理没有动政治关联企业的“奶酪”。We put forward the hypothesis that private firms with political connections avoid tax through the ＂Good- kid＂ mecha- nism legally and private firms without political connections achieve tax avoidance by rent -seeking. Anti - corruption campaigns will lead to lower tax avoidance for private firms without political connections, hut not those with political connections. Consistent with this notion, we find evidence from the shock of the recent anti -corruption campaign since the 18th National Party Congress in China on Chinese listed private companies, and that the lower - tax - avoidance of the anti - corruption campaign on private firms without political connections is more significant on the in the area with lower market - based degree. The results of this pa- per prove that the recent anti - corruption campaign in China does not remove the ＂cheese＂ of the private firms with political con- nections.

关 键 词：腐败治理 避税 双重差分估计 政治关联 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]