PPP模式下酸雨防治投融资博弈研究  

作　　者：兰旭丽 张洪东 廖群立 张飞涟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学土木工程学院,湖南长沙410075

出　　处：《环境保护与循环经济》2018年第8期69-74,共6页environmental protection and circular economy

摘　　要：为解决政府酸雨防治资金匮乏、社会资本方酸雨防治积极性不高等问题,提出基于PPP模式的酸雨防治投融资建议。对政府和社会资本投融资行为作出基本假设,构建政府与社会投融资群体的演化博弈模型,并通过模型计算出博弈过程中博弈双方的复制动态方程;根据复制动态方程和稳定性原理得到均衡点,绘制博弈双方的博弈动态演化趋势图,分析该博弈模型的均衡点及演化路径,得出最终演化稳定策略的最优均衡点和劣均衡点;根据最终演化博弈结论提出酸雨防治投融资建议。建议政府一方面应该加大激励力度,降低实施激励政策所需的成本,增加政府实施激励政策时的社会效益;另一方面,应降低投融资方进行酸雨防治的额外成本,增加政府激励时投融资群体对酸雨防治进行投融资所获得的额外收益。To solve the problems such as the lack of funding of government and the lack of initiative of social capital, the paper put forward the investment and financing management of acid rain treatment based on the PPP pattern. To begin with, based on the basic assumptions for the government and social investment community, build an evolutionary game model between these two groups, and calculate the dynamic equations of them; then, according to the principle of replicated dynamic equation and the stability of equilibrium, to draw the dynamic evolution trend of both sides, analyze the equilibrium of the model and evolution path, as well as obtain the final evolutionary stable strategy of optimal equilibrium and inferior quality; finally, the suggestions for the investment and financing of acid rain were put forward, based on the conclusion of the game. Recommendations include： on the one hand, the government should increase the incentives, reduce costs and increase the social benefits; On the other hand, the government should reduce the extra cost of the social side and increase their extra income.

关 键 词：酸雨防治 PPP模式 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 投融资 

分 类 号：F019.1[经济管理—政治经济学]