地方环境监管部门不作为现象及其治理对策  

Inaction in Local Environment Regulatory Authorities and Its Count-measures

作　　者：谢中起[1] 李妍 XlE Zhong-qi;LI Yan(School of Humanities and Law,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学文法学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《唐山学院学报》2018年第5期92-98,共7页Journal of Tangshan University

基　　金：2016年度河北省社会科学基金项目(HB16GL082)

摘　　要：地方环境监管部门负有监督企业的环境利用行为、制裁其环境违法行为、保证本区域环境质量的重要职责。环境监管不作为其实质在于行政主体消极行使行政权力,是被动姿态上的滥用权力,是另一种形式的行政腐败,相比于环境事故的直接造成者,实施不作为行为的环境监管部门责任甚至更重。文章研究了地方环境监管部门在环境政策的制定、执行、监督以及调整中的不作为现象,分析其背后的原因,给出了相应的治理对策。The local environmental regulatory authorities have the responsibility to supervise the environmental use of enterprises, to sanction their illegal action for environmental damage, and to protect the regional environment quality. The inaction of the regulators is in essence the negative renouncement of their administrative power, and it is the passive abuse of power and is another form of administrative corruption. Compared with the direct person liable for environmental accidents, the environmental regulatory authorities with inaction take more responsibil ronmental policy making, im and resent the corresponding ity. the authors study local environmental regulators in enviplementation, supervision and adjustment, analyze its reasons solutions.

关 键 词：环境治理 地方环境监管部门 监管不作为 

分 类 号：D63-31[政治法律—政治学]