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作 者:朱颖慧 邹能锋[1] ZHU Yinghui;ZOU Nengfeng(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Agricultural University,Hefei Anhui 230036,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽农业大学经济管理学院,安徽合肥230036
出 处:《重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版)》2018年第5期111-116,共6页Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences(Social Sciences Edition)
摘 要:以A股上市中在2010—2014年间实施过股权激励计划的471家公司为研究样本,以样本公司的股权激励计划和年度财务数据为基础,通过回归分析探究上市公司对管理层进行股权激励和公司盈余管理程度的关系。结果表明:股权激励强度越大管理层进行盈余管理的程度越高;而股权激励计划有效期时间越长,管理层盈余管理水平将下降;采用股票期权激励方式将降低管理层的盈余管理水平。Appearing in the a-share listed in 2010—2014, the implementation of equity incentive plans of 471 companies as research samples, samples of the company's equity incentive plans and annual financial data as the foundation, through the regression analysis to explore the listed company was carried out on the management equity incentive and the relationship between the degree of earnings management the company, the results show that the equity incentive intensity, the greater the management for the higher the degree of earnings management; And the longer the validity of equity incentive plan, management earnings management level will fall; Using stock options incentive way to reduce the management level of earnings management.
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