多元企业和专业企业捆绑销售策略博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Bundling Strategies for Generalist and Specialist Firms

作　　者：王海平[1] 刘树林[1] 林军[1] WANG Hai-ping;LIU Shu-lin;LIN Jun(School of Management,Xi＇an Jiaotong University,Xi＇an 710049,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《预测》2018年第5期43-49,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672140);国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL032)

摘　　要：捆绑销售问题相关研究多关注垄断企业捆绑定价或多元企业之间产品兼容问题,很少涉及多元企业和专业企业竞争的市场结构。并且,这些研究大都假设产品之间严格互补。本文针对单向互补的两类产品,利用垂直差异化模型,分析了一个多元企业和两个专业企业在不同质量优劣情况下的捆绑策略博弈均衡。结果显示:(1)若多元企业和专业企业的两类产品都比较同质,前者绑定,后者不绑定;(2)若多元企业没有明显劣势,且至少有一类产品显著优于专业企业,两者都绑定;(3)若专业企业没有明显劣势,且至少在一类产品上非常占优势,多元企业不绑定,专业企业绑定;(4)若多元企业和专业企业各有明显的优势和劣势,两者都不绑定。The existing research on bundling pays more attention to the bundling pricing of a monopolist or the compati- bility decision among muhiproduct firms, little considers the market structure that muhiproduct firms compete with specialized firms. Moreover, most of these studies assume that products are strictly complementary. Aiming at two categories of products which are one-way complements and using a vertical differentiation model, this paper analyzes the equilibrium to bundling game between a muhiproduct generalist firm and two single-product specialist firms under different quality leadership conditions. Results show that ： （ 1 ） if the generalist firm and the specialist firms are homoge- neous in both categories, the former bundles while the latter does not; （2） if the generalist firm has no obvious weak- ness, and at least one category of product is much superior to its rival, then both bundle ; （3） if the specialist firms have no obvious weakness, and are very; superior in at least one category, then they bundle while the generalist firm does not; （4） If the generalist firm and the specialist firms each has obvious superiority and obvious inibriority, then neither bundles.

关 键 词：绑定策略 联盟 互补产品 多元企业 专业企业 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]