博弈论视角下的网贷平台监管  

The Supervision of Online Lending Platforms From the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：张丽萍[1] 万校基[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《浙江金融》2018年第8期3-8,23,共7页Zhejiang Finance

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金面上项目(2015J01581)成果;华侨大学哲学社会科学青年学者成长工程项目(14SKGC-QG17)成果;华侨大学高层次人才科研启动经费项目(14SKBS205)成果

摘　　要：研究政府与网贷平台间博弈关系,通过在支付矩阵中引入公众满意度、平台信誉和政府奖励等条件时发现:政府期望收益与网贷平台诚信规范经营成正相关,而网贷平台期望收益与政府监管力度成负相关;同时,平台信誉的引入可以缓解政府对网贷平台的监管,从而降低政府监管成本。针对引入政府奖励后可能产生的悖论情形,通过进一步考察两个实力相当网贷平台间的重复博弈关系时发现:当政府奖励超过收益损失两倍时,两平台均倾向于诚信规范经营。The game relationship between government and online lending platforms is studied. After introducing the public satisfaction index, platform reputation and government rewards into the payment matrix, we find the following conclusions： firstly, the correlation between the expected revenue of government and online lending platforms＇ standard business is positive, and there is negative correlation between the expected revenue of online lending platforms and government supervision. Meanwhile, the pull-in of platform reputation can relieve the supervision of government over online lending platforms, and further reduce the regulation cost. As to the paradox situation caused by government rewards, this paper discloses the fact that two online lending platforms with similar strength will tend to operate legally if the government rewards is more than twice the benefit-loss of online lending platforms.

关 键 词：网贷平台 公众满意度 平台信誉 政府奖励 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]