特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所民事责任、合伙人行为与审计质量--基于博弈论的视角  

Civil Liability, Partner Behavior and Audit Quality of Limited Liabilities Partnership Accounting Firms: From the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：蒋尧明[1] 肖洁 JIANG Yao-ming;XIAO Jie(Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心/江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《当代财经》2018年第10期113-122,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地(高水平创新团队)2017年度项目“会计师事务所人力资本特征、审计师声誉与审计质量关系研究”(JD17038)

摘　　要：通过构建公司管理层、执业合伙人、其他合伙人与投资者的不完全信息博弈模型,研究了特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所执业合伙人及其他合伙人面对不同性质、不同程度的民事责任时所采取的不同行为,以及这些行为对审计质量的影响。研究发现:随着特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所民事责任的提高,执业合伙人会降低与公司管理层的合谋动机并提高自身的专业能力,这对审计质量会产生正面影响;此外,其他合伙人为避免承担连带责任,会干涉执业合伙人与公司管理层的合谋,这对审计质量也有正面影响。By constructing an incomplete information game model of company management, practicing partners, other partners and investors, this paper studies the different behaviors of the practicing partners and other partners of the limited liabilities partnership accounting firms when faced with civil liabilities with different natures and different degrees and the impacts of these behaviors on the audit qualities. The findings show that with the increase of civil liabilities of the limited liabilities partnership accounting firms, the practicing partners will reduce the collusion motivation with the company＇s management and improve their professional competence, which will have a positive impact on audit quality. In addition, in order to avoid bearing the joint and several liabilities, other partners will interfere with the collusion between the practicing partners and the company＇s management, which also has a positive impact on the audit quality.

关 键 词：民事责任 审计质量 合伙人 特殊普通合伙制 会计师事务所 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学]