中央投资项目跨区配置的决定因素:经济准则还是政治影响力  

Determinants of Central Investment Across Chinese Regions: Economic Normative Criteria or Political Clout

作　　者：苑德宇[1] 宋小宁[2] 李德刚 Yuan Deyu;Song Xiaoning;Li Degang(University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;Sun Yet-sen University,Guangdong Guangzhou 510275,China;Beijing International Studies University,Beijing 100024,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029 [2]中山大学管理学院,现代会计与财务研究中心,广东广州510275 [3]北京第二外国语学院经贸与会展学院,北京100024

出　　处：《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第5期30-43,共14页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“基础设施驱动经济空间集聚的理论机制、经验证据及政策方案优化研究”(71503042);国家自然科学基金面上项目“资源丧失视角下的独立董事强制辞职研究”(71672198);北京市社会科学基金项目“北京市政基础设施系统协调性测度及优化策略研究”(18YJB014);中央高校基本科研业务费项目“政府治理、二元消费结构与企业转型”(17wkpy22)

摘　　要：长期以来,中央投资项目作为地方经济发展的重要推动力,其如何在省际间配置备受关注。文章基于中国制度背景拓展了中央投资决策均衡模型,提出了反映效率、公平以及政治影响力的中央投资跨区配置理论假说。文章通过构建空间面板模型并利用中国1998—2015年省际数据进行检验后发现:效率因素和政治影响力均一致显著正向影响了中央投资,而公平因素的影响则不显著。通过跨时对比可以看出,效率因素对中央投资的影响由1998—2007年不显著变为2008—2015年的正向显著。而政治影响力回归系数的显著性在这两个时段间则发生了与效率因素相反的转变。这一结论可为中央政府在利用投资项目促增长、调结构、惠民生等方面提供政策支持。The central government investment usually guides the local investment, and accomplishes a great task with little effort by clever maneuvers in the rapid economy growth in the past thirty years. Faced with the widening gap in regional development, the distribution of central investment projects should pay more attention to equity or efficiency factors？ Answering this question is helpful to explain the disparity and change of the regional development level from the perspective of central investment. In addition, the provincial political influence may also＂interfere＂ with the efficiency and fairness of central investment projects. This paper extends the theoretical model of central investment decision-making, and puts forward the theoretical hypothesis of central investment on economic criteria and political influences. The ＂political influence＂ factor is measured by the number of Central Committee members（including Politburo members and central alternate members） in each province. The supreme organ of power is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The most important decisions are usually made by the Central Committee. The number of Central Committee members in each province determines the political influence of each province. We use the unit infrastructure output level and per capita GDP to measure efficiency factors and equity factors respectively.This paper constructs a spatial dynamic panel model and conducts an empirical test by using Chinese 1998-2015 inter-provincial data.The empirical results show that both efficiency and the political influence have a significant positive impact on central investment,while equity is insignificant.In cross-temporal comparison,the impact of efficiency factors on central investment is insignificant in 1998-2007 and positive in 2008-2015;while the impact of equity and the political influence changes from significant positive to insignificant.The policy implication of these empirical findings is that policy adjustments should be made in the followi

关 键 词：中央投资 经济准则 政治影响力 空间动态面板模型 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]