地方税收增长与政治周期的关系研究  

A Study on the Relationship between Political Cycle and the Growth of Local Taxes

作　　者：庞伟[1] 孙玉栋[1] PANG Wei, SUN Yu-dong,(Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学公共管理学院,北京100872

出　　处：《当代财经》2018年第9期26-37,共12页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"经济新常态下社会事业财政投入重大问题研究"(17JZD014)

摘　　要：从政治周期的角度看,地方税收增长受到地方官员晋升激励和风险规避两方面的影响。在党代会召开当年,地方总体税收会出现显著的增长。政治周期对地方独享税的影响并不显著,但地方共享税及其共享税中增值税、个人所得税和企业所得税的收入增长会随着党代会的召开呈现周期性变化。可以看出,我国地方税收增长与政治周期存在显著的联系。为保障和规范地方政府的财政收入增长,我国可以从加快税收立法进程、明确中央与地方对税务部门财政经费的支出责任、调整官员政治晋升考核指标、健全地方税体系和完善非税收入管理制度等五个方面着手改进。From the perspective of political cycle, the growth of local tax is affected by the two aspects： the promotion incentive of local officials and the risk aversion. In the year when the local Party Congress is held, the total local tax will have a significant growth. The political cycle has no significant impact on the local exclusive tax, but the income growth of the local shared tax and its VAT, the individual income tax and the corporate income tax will present periodical changes along with the holding of the congress of Party representatives. It can be seen that there is a significant relationship between the growth of China＇s local taxes and the political cycle. In order to safeguard and regulate the growth of local government revenue, China can make improvements from such five aspects as speeding up the process of taxation legislation, clarifying the expenditure responsibilities of the central and local governments for the financial funds of the tax departments, adjusting the indicators for performance appraisal of official political promotion, perfecting the local tax system, and improving the non-tax revenue management system.

关 键 词：地方税收 税收增长 政治周期 官员晋升激励 共享税 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]