国际贸易与庇古税规则——基于完全垄断的视角  

International Trade and Pigouvian Taxation: From the Perspective of Complete Monopoly

作　　者：柯美高 KE Mei-gao

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2018年第10期17-30,共14页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：感谢对外经济贸易大学消费经济研究院的资助

摘　　要：文章拓展了巴尔尼特(A. H. Barnett) 1980年建立的模型,首次以非博弈论为基础,把国际贸易和完全垄断同时纳入模型中探讨环境税与边际外部损害之间的关系。文章发现:第一,当关税税率保持不变,二级最优税和边际外部损害与国内销售份额的比值二者之间的大小关系取决于需求价格弹性;第二,当市场结构保持不变,二级最优税和边际外部损害与国内销售份额的比值二者之间的大小关系取决于关税税率;第三,当模型中引入国际贸易因素后,二级最优税和边际外部损害与国内销售份额的比值二者之差的绝对值随着需求价格弹性绝对值的增加最终是增加还是减小取决于需求价格弹性的绝对值与临界值之间的大小关系。This paper develops A. H. Barnett （1980） ＇s between the environmental pollution tax and marginal external model to study the relationship damage by including international trade and complete monopoly into the model simultaneously on the basis of non-game theory for the first time. It is found that： 1） when the tariff rate keeps the same, whether the second-best optimal tax is higher or lower than the ratio of marginal external damage to domestic sales share depends upon the price elasticity of demand; 2） when the market structure keeps the same, whether the second-best optimal tax is higher or lower than the ratio of marginal external damage to domestic sales share depends upon the tariff rate; 3） when the factor of international trade is introduced into the model, whether the absolute value of the differential between the second -best optimal tax and the ratio of marginal external damage to domestic sales share increases or decreases with the increase of the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand depends upon the relationship between the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand and the critical wlu,~

关 键 词：贸易自由化 庇古税规则 负外部性 二级最优税 垄断 

分 类 号：F721[经济管理—产业经济]