具有不同时间偏好的反恐重复博弈分析  

Analysis of anti-terrorism repeated game with different time preference

作　　者：白云涛[1] 刘德海[1] BAI Yuntao;LIU Dehai(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance ＆ Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第10期2620-2628,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71271045,71571033,71571035,71503033)~~

摘　　要：面对着恐怖主义威胁的日益长期化,政府、平民和恐怖分子表现出不同的时间偏好.本文构建了具有不同时间偏好的反恐重复博弈模型.首先构建了政民协同反恐和反恐失利两种反恐情景下的阶段博弈模型.然后,博弈方在重复博弈中的策略设计为分别采取了趋于均衡的随机化策略以及采取趋于偏离的随机化策略,比较了两种随机化策略下不同时间偏好和参与方偏离行为对于博弈支付函数的影响.研究结果表明,首先,随着政府或恐怖分子采取的随机化策略趋于稳定其将注重长期收益,随着政府或恐怖分子采取的策略愈发非理性和不稳定他们的行为将趋于短期化.其次,由于政府、平民和恐怖分子在反恐博弈中接近于零和博弈,因此任何一方采取非均衡的随机化行为都将导致其它两方收益的上升,但是政府和平民之间存在着一损俱损、一荣俱荣的政民协同效应.第三,如果恐怖分子采取了趋于均衡的随机化策略,则政府充分利用恐怖分子的失误实现短期收益最大化.但是,如果恐怖分子采取了趋于偏离的随机化策略,则政府注重制定长期的反恐策略.Governments, civilians and terrorists have different time preferences as terrorism becomes increasingly permanent. The article constructs the anti-terrorist repeated game model with different time preference. Firstly, the paper establishes the stage game model including the two anti-terrorism scenarios：government-civilian collaboration, anti-terrorism failure. Secondly, the players＇ strategies in the repeated game designs as two types of randomized strategy： one tends to the equilibrium and the other deviates from the equilibrium,then the influence of different time preferences and participant＇s deviating behaviors on the standardized payment function is compared under the two randomized strategies. Some results are showed in the article： Firstly, as governments or terrorists adopt a strategy of randomization,they will focus on long-term gains and as governments or terrorists adopt strategies that are increasingly irrational and destabilizing, their behaviour will tend to be short-lived. Secondly, due to the government, the civilian and the terrorists are close to a zero-sum game in the game against terrorism, any one taking the disequilibrium randomized behavior will lead to other two sides increasing incomes,but there is a collaborative effect between governments and civilians where all is lost or all is glory. Thirdly, if terrorists adopt a randomized strategy closed to equilibrium, governments take full advantage of the terrorists＇ mistakes to maximize the governments＇ short-term gains. However, if terrorists take a randomized strategy tendency to deviate from equilibrium, governments are focused on developing a long-term counter-terrorism strategy.

关 键 词：时间偏好 恐怖主义 重复博弈 随机化策略 政民协同 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]