不同权力结构下TPL服务增值的供应链决策与效率评价  

Decision Making and Efficiency Evaluation in A Supply Chain with TPL’s Value-added Services Under Different Power Structures

作　　者：冯颖[1] 张炎治[1] FENG Ying;ZHANG Yan-zhi(School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2018年第10期164-175,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：中国矿业大学双一流建设“文化传承创新”重点专项(2018WHCC05)

摘　　要：在供应商批发价格内生、TPL服务增值情形下,研究由供应商、TPL和零售商组成的三级供应链决策与效率评价。基于不同权力结构,构建了TPL和供应商主导的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了博弈均衡解均存在且唯一。研究表明：两种权力结构下系统利润均出现损失,TPL主导下零售商的订购量、TPL的物流服务水平及二者比值均低于供应商主导的情形,故TPL主导致使供应链运作效率更低。为提高系统运作效率,以TPL的利润结构为出发点,在两种权力结构下均分别引入TPL物流服务费用及成本分摊策略,发现：费用分摊策略下,供应商通过操控批发价格抑制了费用分摊的影响,从而造成策略失效;而成本分摊策略下,当分摊系数满足特定条件时,能够提高两种权力结构下的系统效率以及实现系统帕累托改进。最优的分摊系数仅取决于各权力结构下,无分摊策略时TPL和系统的期望利润。With the rapid development of the third-party logistics industry- the competitive advantage of the third-party logistics service provider （TPL） is increasingly prominent in terms of operation scale, in- tegration services and information acquisition. This has driven fundamental changes of relevant economic forces in supply chain. How TPL＇s economic power change affects the decision-making and operation ef- ficiency of upstream and downstream members of the supply chain is a kind of theoretical problem with re- search significance. Based on above background, this study aims to explore the influence of different power structures on decision-making and operational efficiency in a three-echelon supply chain including a sup- plier, a TPL provider and a retailer, to seek an effective path of improving system efficiency under each structure. Considering the endogenous wholesale price and the value-added logistics services, we develop two sequential non-cooperative game models are developed when the TPL provider and suppler act as leaders respectively. The game equilibrium solutions in above two models are proved to be exist and u- nique. Research shows that the total expected profits under two structures are lower than that in central- ized setting. The retailer＇s ordering quantity, TPL＇s logistics service level and the ratio between them un- der TPL-led situation are lower than the corresponding results under supplier-led situation. Thus, TPL -led mode results in the lower system operational efficiency. With the TPL-s profit structure as the start- ing point, we introduce logistics service fee sharing and cost sharing strategies into each structure, in order to improve the operational efficiency. Then, it is found that the influence of fee-sharing is suppressed when the supplier could manipulate the wholesale price, which leads to the failure of strategy in both two structures. However, the system operational efficiency can be improved and also the Pareto improvement can be achieved under logistics service co

关 键 词：权力结构 TPL 三级供应链 序贯非合作博弈 效率评价 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]