共享经济背景下政府规制与供给意愿关系研究  

Research on the Relationship between Government Regulation and Supply Intention in the Context of Sharing Economy

作　　者：沈超红[1] 胡安 SHEN Chaohong;HU An(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2018年第6期47-59,共13页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"共享经济现象的CHS理论建构与实证研究"(17AGL003)

摘　　要：共享经济能增加就业机会,提高闲置资产利用率,也会对传统企业造成冲击。政府如何应对共享经济,是一个有待研究的问题。在分析"滴滴出行"案例的基础上,发现了政府规制对供给意愿的影响。通过模拟共享出行实验发现,无政府规制、事前规制、事后规制对供给意愿的影响存在显著差异,无政府规制供给意愿最高,事前规制供给意愿最低,造成这种差异的原因在于规制导致的供给者剩余不同。进一步研究发现,"监管俘获"是政府规制的重要动因之一,研究发现对于政府如何应对共享经济提供了有益的启示。Sharing economy can increase the employment opportunities and the utilization of idle assets, and also can attack traditional businesses. How the government deals with the sharing economy is a subject to be studied. Based on the analysis of the case of ＂ DiDi＂ , we find out the influence of government regulation on supply intention. Through simulating sharing travel experiments, it is found that no government regulation, ex-regulation and post-regulation impose significant diversified influence on supply intention, with no government regulation having the highest supply intention and pre-regulation having the minimum one. The reason for this discrepancy arises from the ditterent supplier surplus caused by regulations. Further literature research finds that ＂ regulatory capture＂ is one of the important motives for government regulation. The discovery of this article provides useful enlightenment to the government on how to deal with the sharing economy.

关 键 词：政府规制 供给意愿 事前规制 事后规制 供给者剩余 监管俘获 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]