售电市场环境下售电公司与电力用户双层博弈模型研究  

Study on Two-Level Game Model between Retailers and Users in Electric Selling Market

作　　者：孙云涛 宋依群[1] SUN Yun-tao;SONG Yi-qun(School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院,上海200240

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2018年第10期210-214,共5页Water Resources and Power

摘　　要：售电市场放开是我国售电侧改革的发展方向,竞争性售电市场中用户选择权放开,用户选择结果影响售电公司的售电策略,售电公司售电策略又会直接影响用户选择。构建售电公司与电力用户间双层博弈模型,下层模型为用户层演化博弈,上层模型为售电公司间非合作博弈。首先分析影响用户选择售电公司的因素,建立用户效用模型,采用演化博弈理论构建不同类型用户群体选择售电公司的多群体动态演化模型。在构建用户选择模型的基础上,分析售电公司的购售电策略,计及售电公司面临的风险因素,建立售电公司和电力用户的双层博弈模型并给出了博弈均衡的求解算法。算例分析结果表明,所构建的模型和算法具有可行性和有效性。The liberalization of electric selling market is the development direction of China＇s reform of the electricity market.Power consumers have options to choose among retailers in competitive electric selling market,and the selection results interact with the competitive strategies of the retailers.A two-level game model between retailers and users is established,the lower level of which is an evolutionary game between users and the upper level is a non-cooperative game between retailers.Factors that affect users＇ choices of retailers in the electric selling market are analyzed,and the user utility model is established.Then a dynamic evolutionary model which shows different types of users choosing retailers is established based on evolutionary game theory.On the basis of the lower level model,a two-level game model between retailers and users is established considering the competitive strategies of the retailers and the risk factors the retailers are facing.Finally,the algorithm of the model is proposed.The results of typical case indicate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed two-level game model.

关 键 词：售电市场 用户选择 演化博弈 售电策略 双层博弈 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济] TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]