克里普克信念之迷的几种解决方案  

The Solutions to Kripke’s Puzzle

作　　者：聂大海[1] 刘洋[1] Nie Da-hai;Liu Yang(Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学

出　　处：《外语学刊》2018年第6期36-40,共5页Foreign Language Research

基　　金：吉林大学基本科研业务费哲学社会科学研究种子基金项目“克里普克语言指称理论研究”(2015ZZ022)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：克里普克信念语句替换问题一直困扰着语言哲学家，成为当代语言哲学研究中的未解之谜，被称为克里普克信念之谜。本文详细讨论克里普克的解决路径以及塞尔和戴维森等的解决方案。塞尔认为由于不同的意向内容分别与Londres和London相关联．克里普克信念命题并非矛盾命题。戴维森则否定信念的存在，认为信念不在人的大脑中。在克里普克看来，信念之谜与语义无关，而与信念本质有关。但克里普克并未给出信念本质的进一步分析。沿着克里普克的这一解决思路，如果信念之谜确是信念本身的问题，那么我们对信念本质做细致的语言哲学分析将有助于这个难题的解决。Many philosophers wottld be puzzled by Kripke＇s puzzle in contemporary philosophy of language . This paper mainly discusses Searle, Davidson and Salmon＇s solutions to the problem, especially Kripke＇s approach to the solution. Searle believes the speaker associates different intentional contents with ＂Londres＂ and ＂London＂, therefore Kripke＇s propositions are not contradictories. Davidson denies the existence of beliefs and holds that they are not in the brain. Kripke believes that the puzzle connects with the nature of beliefs and can not be solved in a semantic way, but be gives no further analysis of the nature. If Kripke＇s puzzle is the belief in question, we attempt to solve the problem by analyzing the nature of beliefs philosophically.

关 键 词：专名 替换 信念语句 哲学语言分析 信念本质 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]