腐败治理、税收执法与民营企业避税  

Anti-corruption, Tax Enforcement and Private Firms' Tax-Avoidance

作　　者：付朝干 李增福[1] Fu Chaogan;Li Zengfu(School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China;Department of Finance and Taxation,Guangxi Cadres University of Economics and Management,Nanning 530007,China)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006 [2]广西经济管理干部学院财税金融系,广西南宁530007

出　　处：《财经研究》2018年第11期47-60,共14页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172198);华南师范大学2016年研究生创新计划(2016wkxm04)

摘　　要：前期研究表明,腐败降低了企业避税成本,提高了企业避税程度。在中国,按照适用所得税税率以及日常经营所受到检查监督的差异,民营企业的避税策略可分为保守与激进两种类型,而后者通过寻租实现有效避税。文章以2009-2016年中国A股民营上市公司为研究样本,以保守避税企业作为对照组,利用双重差分法评估了十八大以来的腐败治理对激进避税民营企业避税程度的影响。研究发现,这类企业的避税程度在腐败治理后反而明显提高。对此,文章提出由于税收政策设置不完善,部分执法者通过提高执法强度来谋取私利。腐败治理会抑制这种行为,降低执法强度,引起激进避税民营企业的避税程度提高。在腐败治理的同时,增强税收执法者正直执法的物质或政治激励,可同时实现消除税收腐败与降低激进避税民营企业避税程度的双重目标。文章从税务领域证明了国家近期出台的注重政治上激励干部担当作为的新措施的正确、及时和有效,也为强化行政执法者不想腐的自觉提供了理论借鉴。From a theoretical perspective（Vishny and Shleify, 1993）, corruption in tax reduces costs.Using firm-level cross-country data, an important paper by Alm, et al.（2016） provides evidence that it is corruption that largely drives higher levels of tax-avoidance. According to the above conclusions, when a country or region takes anti-corruption and tax inspectors no longer dare to accept bribes, will the degree of tax-avoidance of firms naturally decline？ The conclusions of this paper show that things are not that simple. In China, private firms can be divided into conservative tax-avoidance private firms and aggressive taxavoidance private firms according to the income tax rate and the inspection and supervision from the government and other firms. Aggressive tax-avoidance private firms achieve higher degree of tax-avoidance through rent-seeking before the anti-corruption campaign since the 18 th Party Congress in China. Using the sample of Chinese listed private firms during 2009-2016, we choose the private firms which are conservative in taxavoidance as a control group and use the DID method to assess the impact of the recent anti-corruption campaign in China on tax-avoidance of aggressive tax-avoidance private firms. The empirical results show that the recent anti-corruption campaign in China enhances rather than lowers the degree of tax-avoidance of aggressive tax-avoidance private firms. We employ and develop the theory model initiated by Mookherjee and Png（1995） to explain this conflict.We find it is obvious that the degree of tax-avoidance of firms will decline as tax inspectors become less corrupt when information is symmetric between firms and tax inspectors or the inspector intensity of tax inspectors keeps constant before and after the anti-corruption campaign. However, the symmetry of informationbetween the two parties is a very strong assumption. Under the condition of information asymmetry, if the performance incentives for the honest inspection and the penalty for the collusion set by the

关 键 词：腐败治理 税收执法 企业避税 双重差分估计 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]