环境支出、地区竞争与环境污染——对环境竞次的一种解释  

Environmental Expenditure, Interregional Competition and Environmental Pollution——An Explanation on the Environmental Issue of "Race to the Bottom"

作　　者：张华[1,2] ZHANG Hua(School of Economies,Fudan University,Shanghai 20043;School of Business Administration,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院 [2]南京审计大学商学院

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2018年第12期1-14,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71703073;71601098;71502083);江苏省社会科学基金项目(16GLC005);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2017M610218);江苏高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2016SJB790019)

摘　　要：利用中国284个城市的面板数据检验地区间环境支出竞争的存在性与形式,并进一步估计环境支出对环境污染的影响。研究发现,地区间环境支出存在显著的模仿型竞争;同时,环境支出不能有效遏制环境污染,并存在污染治理的＂搭便车＂倾向。这意味着地区间环境支出趋于＂低水平＂均衡,造成＂你低我更低＂的囚徒困境,为环境竞次理论提供实证支撑。本文认为,环境支出不足的动因是地区间策略竞争,后果是制约了环境支出的减排效应。Using a panel data of 284 cities in China, this paper investigated the existence and forms of interregional environmental expenditure competition, and further estimated the impact of environmental expenditure on environmental pollution. The results show that, there is a significant copycat competition in the interregional environmental expenditure across cities. Furthermore, environmental expenditure can not effectively curb environmental pollution, and there is a ＂free rider＂ tendency in pollution control. These findings imply that interregional environmental expenditure tends to be a ＂lower level＂ equilibrium, which leads to the prisoner dilemma of ＂I＇m worse than you＂ and provides empirical evidence for the theory of race to the bottom. In a word, the reason for the lack of environmental expenditure is due to interregional strategic competition, the consequence of which is to restrict the emission-reduction effect of environmental expenditure.

关 键 词：环境支出 地区竞争 环境污染 环境竞次 环境公共品 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]