基于银行履约保函的节水设备制造业联盟保障机制  

Water Saving Equipment Manufacturing Alliance Guarantee Mechanism Based on Bank Performance Bonds

作　　者：王强 刘海英[1,2] 刘海军 任春[1,2] 刘鑫 WANG Qiang;LIU Hai-yin;LIU Hai-jun;REN Chun;LIU Xin(Ordos Institute of Applied Technology,Erdos 017000,China;Inner Mongolia University,Ordos School,Erdos 017000,China)

机构地区：[1]鄂尔多斯应用技术学院交通运输系,内蒙古鄂尔多斯017000 [2]内蒙古大学鄂尔多斯学院,内蒙古鄂尔多斯017000

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第22期27-33,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71563031);内蒙古自治区自然科学基金(2015MS0714);鄂尔多斯市科技计划(YY201610045);鄂尔多斯应用技术学院项目(KYZD2017003)

摘　　要：近年来，中国节水设备制造企业联盟蓬勃发展，由于传统的联盟合作协议，容易诱发机会主义倾向，联盟稳定性差。通过对节水设备制造企业联盟合作前后利润分析，构建了节水设备制造企业联盟合作效应模型。通过对企业违反联盟协议的最大利润计算，得出银行履约保函的最低保障金额，引入保障系数，构建了银行履约保函金额计算模型。通过算例仿真，得出在银行履约保函制度下，各企业遵守联盟获得的收益最大。In recent years, China＇s water-saving equipment manufacturing alliances flourish, due to the traditional alliance cooperation agreement, prone to opportunistic inclinations, coalition stability is poor. Through the water-saving equipment manufacturing alliance before and after the cooperative profit analysis, building a water-saving equipment manufacturing alliance cooperative effect model. Through the calculation of the maximum profit of the enterprise in violation of the alliance agreement, the minimum guarantee amount of the bank＇s performance bond is obtained, and the guarantee coefficient is introduced to build the calculation model of the bank＇s performance bond amount. Through simulation, each company comply with the union gain more than betrayal coalition.

关 键 词：节水设备制造 联盟合作 银行履约保函 保障机制 

分 类 号：F426.4[经济管理—产业经济]