量子力学多世界解释视角下的睡美人悖论  

A Many-Worlds Analysis of the Sleeping Beauty Paradox

作　　者：万子谦 万小龙[1] WAN Zi-qian;WAN Xiao-long(School of Humanities,Hnazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学人文学院哲学系,武汉430074

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2018年第6期26-30,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BZX022);教育部社会科学基金项目(15YJA720006);山西省高等学校人文社科重点研究基地项目(2015302)

摘　　要：对于概率哲学,睡美人悖论是无法回避的一个问题。按照这一悖论的设置,概率哲学的基本预设将导出和直觉极不一致的结论。对在这一问题上学者所持的两种不同观点进行分析,可以发现他们在理解这一悖论的设置上有着根本性的互相误解,即对于相对频率和概率倾向未做适当区分。多世界解释为概率性事件的描述提供了新的理论框架,即将某一概率性事件的不同后果描述为分裂的世界枝结构。借用这一描述方式,可以明确区分不同的概率类型,避免误解,消除睡美人悖论。For the philosophy of probability,sleeping beauty paradox is an unavoidable problem. According to this paradox,the basic presuppositions of the philosophy of probability lead to inconsistent conclusion. By analyzing the two major views about this problem,it can be found that they have a mutual misunderstanding of the paradox,that is,there is no proper distinction between relative frequencies and probability tendencies. The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics provides a new theoretical framework for the description of probabilistic events,that is to illustrate the different consequences of a certain probability event as a branching structure. With this description,we can clearly distinguish different types of objective probability,avoid misunderstanding and eliminate the sleeping beauty paradox.

关 键 词：概率哲学 睡美人悖论 量子力学哲学 多世界解释 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]