比较视野下商业银行破产之特殊性制度探讨  

The Research on Special Bank Insolvency Regime——the Competitive Prospect

作　　者：申始占 SHEN Shi-zhan(Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488

出　　处：《时代法学》2018年第6期63-69,共7页Presentday Law Science

摘　　要：随着供给侧改革的深入开展,对金融机构来说,如何在控制金融风险的前提下清理诸多的僵尸企业,推进银行业破产制度的改革,是我们必须要面临的一个重要问题。银行业破产不同于普通企业破产,存在着更为严重的挤兑效应。考虑到银行体系的审慎监管原则,银行破产前置制度可以有效降低经营风险。考虑到银行业经营的复杂性,存款保险机构完全可以胜任临时管理人的角色。而在银行破产财产分配问题上,究竟是优先保护"蛋糕"的大小,还是优先保护"蛋糕"的公平分配,理论和实践都证明应当坚持破产效率优先的原则。With the deepening of the “Supply-Side” reform, how to clear many zombie enterpri-ses on the premise of controlling the financial risk and promote the reform of the banking bankruptcysystem is an important problem that we must face. Bank bankruptcy is different from common enter-prises bankruptcy, the bankruptcy of banking system face more serious problems of “Bank Run”effect than common enterprise. Because of the prudential regulation principle, pre-bankruptcy bank-ing system could reduce the management risk effectively. Considering the complexity of banking op-erations, deposit insurance institutions are fully qualified to act as the temporary manager. As for theproblem of bank bankruptcy property distribution, the theory and practice both prove that we shallgive priority to uphold the principle of efficiency.

关 键 词：破产前置制度 存款保险机构 效率 

分 类 号：DF438.1[政治法律—经济法学]