村级互助资金担保增信兴起的逻辑——基于甘肃省定西市的案例调查  

The Logic of Village-level Mutual Fund Credit Guarantee:Based on Dingxi's Case Investigation

作　　者：郑周胜[1] Zheng Zhousheng(Lanzhou Central Sub -branch, the People＇s Bank of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行兰州中心支行

出　　处：《金融发展评论》2018年第7期128-135,共8页Financial Development Review

摘　　要：贫困地区发展离不开资金的支持,在金融机构逐步退出农村市场的大背景下,如何吸引金融资源回流贫困地区、带动贫困群体脱贫致富是社会各界普遍关注的问题。本文以甘肃省定西市村级互助资金担保增信作为研究对象,分析村级互助资金担保增信兴起的政策背景、运作机制以及经济成效,运用制度经济学理论解释村级互助资金担保增信兴起的逻辑,最后对该制度创新做进一步引申:在其他地区推广定西做法需要有良好的投资发展机会、活跃的乡村精英、农村"三权"确权等条件。The development of poverty-stricken areas is inseparable from the financial support. In the context of gradual withdrawal of financial institutions from the rural market, attracting financial resources to return poverty-stricken areas and driving poverty-stricken villages and households to get rid of poverty have become a common concern of all sectors of society. This paper studies the village-level mutual funds credit guarantee in Dingxi, focusing on its emerging policy background, operational mechanism and effectiveness, explaining and proving the logic of village-level mutual funds credit guarantee under the theory of institutional economics and game theory. The system innovation should be further extended：the promotion of Dingxi in other areas requires good opportunities for investment and development, active rural elites and the confirmation of the ＂three powers＂ in rural areas.

关 键 词：互助资金 担保增信 交易费用 定西案例 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F323.8