央企引入EVA考核影响多元化投资决策吗?——基于长期激励视角的实验研究  

Does the EVA Assessment Affect the Investment Decisions of Diversification:Evidence from an Experimental Research Based on the Perspective of Long-term Incentive

作　　者：胡海波 胡玉明[2] HU Haibo;HU Yuming(School of Economics,Management and Law,University of South China,Hengyang,Hunan 421001,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]南华大学经济管理与法学学院,湖南衡阳421001 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广州510632

出　　处：《城市学刊》2018年第5期43-54,共12页Journal of Urban Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71032006);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302173);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(12YBA268);财政部会计名家培养工程项目(2016)

摘　　要：在中央企业负责人实施EVA考核的背景下,利用实验研究的方法,设计以EVA考核力度和经理人长期激励程度为双因素、3水平的9种实验情境,让被试者做出关于多元化投资选择的决策。研究发现:经理人做出有利于提升企业可持续价值创造能力的多元化投资决策与EVA考核力度、长期激励程度显著正相关,与EVA考核力度和长期激励程度交乘项显著正相关;在没有实施EVA考核的情况下,经理人更倾向于投资短视的、毁坏企业长期价值创造能力的无关业务多元化投资项目;强力推行EVA考核与仅使用利润指标相比,经理人更倾向于摒弃损害企业价值、非效率的无关业务多元化投资项目,选择有利于提升企业可持续价值创造能力的相关业务多元化投资项目;在考核任期延长的情况下,即使没有实施EVA考核,经理人也会倾向于避免投资短视的、毁坏企业长期价值的无关业务多元化项目,经理人任期的适当延长对EVA考核力度和长期激励强度具有显著的替代效用;在长期激励程度弱的环境下,EVA考核力度的增强并没有显著改进经理人的多元化投资决策。Under the background of the implementation of the EVA assessment in central enterprises, sit is very important to reseach the effect of EVA assessment on the manager＇s diversification investment behavior. The nine experimental scenes featuring the double-factor of EVA assessment strength and long-term incentive degree are designed in the experimental study by taking the EVA assessment implemented by the person in charge of the central enterprises as the background. On this basis, the testees are asked to make the diversified decision-making of investment. The rank-sum test, the Logit regression and variance analysis generates the following conclusions： at first, the significant positive correlation is found between the diversified investment decision that is made by the handler and EVA assessment strength and long-term incentive degree as well as their cross-product term. This decision turns to be conducive to enhancing the creative ability of the enterprises’ sustainable values; without the implementation of EVA assessment, the handlers tend to invest the short-sighted unrelated diversified projects that may undermine the enterprises’ creative ability of long-term value; in contrast to the simple utilization of profit norm, the forcible imposition of EVA assessment enables the handlers to abandon the inefficient unrelated diversified investment that may undermine the enterprises’ values and instead, it is to choose the related diversified investment that promotes the enhancing creative abilities of the enterprises’ sustainable values. The research results have not only provided policy suggestions for the supervision and administration departments of state-owned assets of different levels, but also enriched and developed the theories and literatures pertaining to the performance assessment, incentive mechanism and diversification.

关 键 词：EVA考核 长期激励 多元化投资 价值创造 

分 类 号：F014[经济管理—政治经济学]