Government Regulation,Enforcement,and Economic Consequences in a Transition Economy:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies Implementing the Split Share Structure Reform  

作　　者：Dequan Jiang Shangkun Liang Donghua Chen 

机构地区：[1]Research Institute of Accounting and Finance, Nanjing University

出　　处：《China Journal of Accounting Research》2009年第1期71-99,共29页中国会计学刊（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Fund (grant no. 70602011);the National Social Science Fund (grant no. 08CJY009);the support we have received from the IAPHD Project of Nanjing University;the Institution of Accounting and Finance of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;Research Project 985 of the Institution of Economic Transition and Development of Nanjing University

摘　　要：In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy.In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy.

关 键 词：Government regulation ENFORCEMENT Economic consequences Split Share Structure Reform(SSSR) 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F123