政治冲击、银行信贷与会计稳健性  

Political Shocks,Bank Credit and Accounting Conservatism

作　　者：雷光勇[1] 王文忠[2] 邱保印[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心,北京100029 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《财经研究》2015年第3期121-131,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472041);北京市教委-基地共建项目(2015年度);研究生科研创新基金重点项目(201304)的资助

摘　　要：文章以市长更替刻画政治冲击,运用2007-2013年沪深A股上市公司数据,系统考察了政治冲击影响企业会计行为的渠道与后果。研究发现,市长更替导致的政治冲击会显著减少企业的银行信贷规模。为了规避这一影响,企业尤其是具有更多债务的企业会提高会计稳健性。提高会计稳健性能够显著增加企业的银行信贷优势,不仅更易获得信贷,而且信贷规模增加。分产权性质的检验表明,政治冲击对国有企业会计稳健性的影响更大,但民营企业在政治冲击下提高会计稳健性更能显著增加其银行信贷优势。By using the data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2013,this paper takes the mayor turnover as the political shock and systematically investigates the channel and consequences of the effect of political shocks on firm accounting behavior.It shows that political shocks resulting from mayor turnover can significantly reduce the size of corporate bank credit.In order to avoid this effect,enterprises,especially ones with more debt,can increase accounting conservatism.The improvement of accounting conservatism can significantly increase corporate bank credit advantages,namely easier access to credit and the expansion of credit scale.The test based on ownership features shows that political shocks have the greater impact on accounting conservatism in state-owned enterprises,but bank credit advantages of private enterprises can significantly increase because of the improvement of accounting conservatism under political shocks.

关 键 词：政治冲击 银行信贷 会计稳健性 官员更替 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F832.4