二元转型、正规金融合约激励设计与农户融资约束  

Dual Transition,Incentive Design of Formal Financial Contracts and Farmers' Financing Constraints

作　　者：许月丽[1] 王飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财经研究》2015年第5期4-13,101,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY14G030020);浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(13NDJC081YB);浙江工商大学的浙江省人文社科重点研究基地(应用经济学)课题(JYTyyjj20140404)的资助

摘　　要：针对如何解决由农村金融市场特殊性所导致的农户融资难问题,文章以信息不对称条件下的不完全合约理论为基础,从二元转型过程中农村正规金融借贷合约的激励设计这一新视角,对产生这一问题的微观经济机制进行了深入的分析。研究结果表明:(1)二元转型是促进农村正规金融供给与需求增加的重要因素,但仅会引起农村非正规金融需求的显著变化,而对非正规金融供给不具有显著影响;(2)借贷合约激励结构的优化有助于促进农村正规金融机构贷款供给的增加,但并没有形成对非正规金融强有力的替代;(3)新型农村金融机构的引入有助于促进农村借贷合约激励结构的优化,但并没有显著改变农户面临的融资约束问题。This paper intends to solve the common plight of farmers' financing difficulty which is caused by the particularity of rural financial market.From a new perspective of incentive design of formal financial contracts in rural areas during dual transition period it thoroughly analyzes its microeconomic mechanism leading to farmers' financing difficulty based on incomplete contract theory under asymmetry information.It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly,dual transition is the key factor promoting the increase in supply and demand of formal finance in rural areas,but only results in the significant changes in the demand of informal finance in rural areas and has no significant effect on the supply of informal finance;secondly,the optimization of incentive structure of debt contracts helps to advance the rise in credit supply of formal financial institutions in rural areas,but does not lead to an effective substitute for informal finance;thirdly,the introduction of new financial institutions in rural areas is conducive to the optimization of incentive structure of debt contracts in rural areas,but does not obviously change financial constraints facing rural households.

关 键 词：二元转型 合约激励设计 融资约束 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]