IPO配售中的利益联盟——基于基金公司与保荐机构的证据  

The Interest Alliances in the IPO Process:Evidence from Mutual Fund Families and Sponsors

作　　者：孙淑伟[1] 肖土盛[2] 付宇翔[1] 陈信元[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [2]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [3]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2015年第5期90-101,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71402089;71402197);北京市教育委员会共建项目;北京市会计类专业群(改革试点)建设项目;上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2013-305)的资助

摘　　要：文章通过考察基金公司支付给保荐机构的佣金与IPO网下发行获配概率之间的关系,研究了我国IPO配售中的公平性问题。研究结果显示,在IPO前一年,基金公司支付给保荐机构的佣金越多,其获得配售的概率越高,且这一现象主要存在于收益率较高的样本组。由于我国保荐机构并没有自主配售权,文章进一步考察了基金公司为提高获配概率所采取的措施。研究发现,基金公司主要通过提高报价和申购数量的方式达到获配的目的,这一现象亦在收益率较高的样本组中更加明显。上述证据表明,我国IPO配售中存在基金公司与保荐机构结成利益联盟的现象,即保荐机构获得了高额的佣金,基金公司则提前从保荐机构获得发行人的敏感信息,重点参与收益率较高的新股发行项目以获得丰厚的收益。文章的结论对于监管部门改进IPO询价制度具有借鉴价值。By the analysis of the relationship between brokerage commissions paid to sponsors by mutual fund families and the probability of holding IPOs in the offline ration,this paper studies the fairness in IPO process.It arrives at the conclusions that in the previous one year before IPO,more brokerage commissions paid to sponsors by mutual fund families lead to higher probability of holding IPOs in the offline ration,which is more suitable to a sample set with higher returns.Owning to no autonomous ration in China,it further studies the measures to raise the probability of holding IPOs in the offline ration taken by mutual fund families,and reaches the conclusion that mutual fund families offer higher bids and more purchase numbers to achieve the allocation target,especially in a sample set with higher returns.The conclusions above-mentioned show that there are interest alliances in the IPO process between mutual fund families and sponsors,namely sponsors obtain higher brokerage commissions and mutual fund families acquire sensitive information of underwriters from sponsors in advance & place emphasis on IPO programs with higher returns to earn huge profits.This paper provides references for the improvement of IPO inquiry system as for regulation authorities.

关 键 词：新股配售 网下发行 利益联盟 保荐机构 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275