合同生产模式与农产品质量:一个综述及启示  

Incentive Contract and Agro- food Quality:A Research Review and Its Implications

作　　者：蔡荣[1,2] 易小兰[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学粮食安全与战略研究中心,江苏南京210003 [2]南京财经大学江苏省现代粮食流通与安全协同创新中心,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《财贸研究》2015年第3期32-41,共10页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"农业企业与合作农户间的治理机制与交易绩效研究"(71203088);粮食公益性行业科研专项项目(201313009-1);江苏高校优势学科项目建设工程;"青蓝工程"创新团队项目(2014S261)

摘　　要：基于质量考虑,农产品供应链上下游主体间的协作变得越来越重要,合同生产模式则成为农业领域中最重要的垂直协作形式。对国内外有关农产品质量与合同生产模式的经验研究进行梳理总结后发现:农产品质量具有多维属性,当行业内不存在质量分级或存在质量分级但标准偏低时,企业倾向与农户签订合同交易并提供质量奖励;企业对农产品整体质量或某些质量属性的要求越高,市场交易份额就越低,合同交易份额就越高;企业在制定合同交易制度时,对交易可测度的质量属性可以直接提供经济激励或处罚,对交易不可测度或可测度但测度成本高昂的质量属性需对生产行为或使用要素进行控制;出于成本节约或激励效果的考虑,企业向两个及以上的质量属性分别提供溢价激励之前,需谨慎溢价激励之间的交互作用。Based on consideration of quality,players' coordination in the agro-food chain is becoming increasingly important,w hile contract farming becomes the most important vertical form in agricultural sector. This paper review s domestic and foreign literature regarding incentive contracts and the provision of agro-food quality. Agro-food Quality has multidimensional attributes. Agribusiness tends to contract w ith producers and offer rew ards w hen there is no quality grading or grading standards are low er in the line. A desire for higher quality or specific quality attributes of general quality of agricultural products increases the likelihood of contract,but leads to smaller market share. Financial incentives are used w hen an attribute is easily observed at the time of sale,w hereas production and factors should be controlled w hen an attribute is not easily observed or w hen observation cost is high. For the consideration of cost savings or incentive effects,agribusiness should seriously consider interactive effects betw een different contract incentives before providing them.

关 键 词：质量控制 激励合同 信息不对称 农产品供应链 

分 类 号：F322[经济管理—产业经济] F272