横向并购反垄断审查中的竞争损害模拟分析——以一汽并购华晨为例  

Simulation Analysis on the Competition Harm of Horizontal Merger:The Case of FAW Merging Brilliance Auto

作　　者：余东华[1] 王蒙蒙[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《财贸研究》2015年第6期47-54 115,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"要素价格上涨与环境规制趋紧下的中国制造业转型升级路径研究"(14BJY081);山东省自然科学基金面上项目"横向并购竞争效应模拟分析与反垄断政策研究"(ZR2014GM005);山东大学青年学术团队项目"转型期中国反垄断问题研究"(IFYT12072)

摘　　要：在Logit模型的基础上构建模拟分析横向并购竞争损害的结构性方程,提出模拟分析的基本程序,并以一汽并购华晨案为例,对横向并购可能产生的竞争损害进行实证模拟分析。结果显示:汽车行业的横向并购能够明显提高汽车产品价格和并购厂商的利润水平,而非并购企业的利润提高程度有限;在不考虑效率效应的情况下,该项并购给消费者福利带来了巨大损失,进而导致显著的社会福利净损失。为此,中国汽车行业的大规模并购需要审慎操作、合理引导,参与并购的汽车企业应向消费者适当让渡部分并购收益。对横向并购进行反垄断控制,不仅可以保护市场有效竞争,而且能够维护消费者的合法权益,提高社会总福利水平。Structural equation of simulation analysis on competition harm of horizontal mergers and acquisitions is constructed on the basis of the logit model in this paper. The paper also put forw ard basic procedures of simulation analysis,and makes an empirical simulation analysis on competition harm of horizontal merger taking the FAW( First Automotive Works) merging Brilliance for instance. The results of this simulation analysis show that,the horizontal mergers and acquisitions of the automobile industry can obviously improve the prices and the profit level of M &A enterprises,but the non-M &A enterprises have the limit of profit increasing. Without considering the efficiency effect,this merger has made huge losses to the consumer w elfare,and thus produced a net loss of social w elfare obviously. The large scare M &A of China' auto industry should operate prudently and be guided rationally,and the involving enterprises should appropriately transfer part of M &A profit to consumers. Anti-monopoly authorities' control to the horizontal mergers and acquisitions,not only can protect the w orkable competition in the market,but also can improve the social w elfare and maintain the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.

关 键 词：横向并购 竞争损害 需求估计 模拟分析 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]