道德风险、监控成本与合约选择  

Moral Hazard,Monitoring Cost,and the Choice of Contracts

作　　者：约伦.巴泽尔 孙永泉[2] 江静 刘健 

机构地区：[1]美国华盛顿大学经济系 [2]香港大学经济学系

出　　处：《南大商学评论》2005年第2期23-38,共16页Nanjing Business Review

摘　　要：在团队生产中,要测量个人的贡献是非常困难的,团队中的不同成员提供要素和监控的动力都取决于如何分配团队产出的剩余索取权。在最优的雇佣合约中,那些边际产量相对较低的人将成为雇员,因为当他们偷懒时,效率损失相对较小。在分成合约中,每个成员都享有部分剩余索取权,从而降低了所需的监控数量。在分成合约中,那些边际产量比较低的人获得的产出较少,这一点与雇佣合约一样,但没有后者那么极端。When individual' contributions to team production are costly to measure.The incentives for different team members to supply and monitor inputs will depend on the assignment of residual claims to team output.In an optimal employment contract, individuals with relatively low marginal product will become employees because the efficiency loss will be relatively small as they shirk.In a share contract, each member of the team receives a partial residual claim and the optimal amount of monitoring is reduced.Like employment contracts,but not as extremely,an optimal share contract will allocate a relatively small marginal share of team output to individuals with relatively low marginal product.

关 键 词：雇佣合约 监控成本 剩余索取权 分成合约 偷懒 团队生产 

分 类 号：F01[经济管理—政治经济学]